The recent 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) reduced depot infrastructure DOD wide but did little to modernize and transform its depots into a joint system. The Services' current depot systems are legacy establishments whose foundations were laid in the early twentieth century. With the evolution of the commercial defense industrial base during World War II and the Cold War, their research and development roles migrated to the private sector.
For example, the Army system consists of 5 depots that maintain, overhaul, and repair military systems. In general they are Cold War facilities with all the inherent inefficiencies implied in that description. To remain relevant the Army, its sister services and DOD must work on transforming these service depots through lean philosophies, public private partnerships, performance based logistics, and capital investment programs to bring the depot system into the 21st Century to support the overall DOD transformation. Transformation of the depot system requires more efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility to reduce duplication of effort, overhead and long term costs.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMY DEPOT MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
The recent 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) reduced depot maintenance infrastructure Department of Defense (DOD) wide but did little to modernize and transform its depots into a joint system. The Services' current depot systems are legacy establishments whose foundations were laid in the early twentieth century. With the evolution of the commercial defense industrial base during World War II and the Cold War, their research and development roles largely migrated to the private sector. For example, the Army system consists of five maintenance depots that maintain, overhaul, and repair military systems. In addition the Army also has four manufacturing facilities that can perform the same missions as the maintenance depots. In general, these installations are Cold War facilities with all the inherent inefficiencies implied in that description. To remain relevant, the Army, its sister services and DOD must work on transforming these service depots. The Army and DOD must leverage lean philosophies, public private partnerships, performance based logistics, and capital investment programs to bring the depot system into the 21st Century to support the overall DOD transformation. Transformation of the depot system requires more efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility to reduce duplication of effort, overhead and long term costs.
Much has been written over the years on how to best maximize the Department of Defense depots and manufacturing facilities, which are legacy establishments of the Cold War.
However, much of this has fallen on deaf ears. Depot maintenance is big business. The Army depots and manufacturing facilities are generally located in areas where they are the main source of income for the local community. Closure of one of these facilities or reduction of workload would meet with resistance and draw a response from elected officials. One of the largest and most active caucuses in Congress is the Depot Caucus. The members of this caucus have a vested interest in workload assigned to these facilities.
The time to leverage public-private partnerships, better business practices, and laws to move these installations into the 21 st Century is now. Laws will have to be rewritten to better define the missions of these installations. To gain greater effectiveness and efficiency, the Army's depots and arsenals must be integrated into a joint system, which looks out not just six years, a POM cycle, but looks out to 2025. This is imperative for the Army as its maintenance depots will play a critical role in resetting over 50 brigades, consisting of 615 aircraft, 7,000 combat vehicles, and 30,000 wheeled vehicles.
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The focus of this paper is not to argue the results of BRAC but to offer how to best maximize the five maintenance depots, three arsenals, and one manufacturing center in support of the Army and the Department of Defense. It should be noted that the Army is the only service that has arsenals. For the purpose of this paper arsenals will be referred to as manufacturing facilities. The depots and manufacturing facilities and major missions are shown in In the last 50 years, the highest number of direct labor hours that have to be generated in these eight -these eight sites is 25 million direct labor hours. By closing Red River and then configuring it into centers of excellence….we have the ability to -still surge to 50 million direct labor hours. So we can double the capacity with one less depot.
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The BRAC Commission did not support the closure of Red River Army Depot recommending the Depot be realigned retaining most of its depot maintenance functions. Organic Industrial Base eliminating single function installations and creating multifunctional and multiuse facilities, which enable it to partner with industry to maximize the capabilities from both sources to achieve the "most favorable and economical efficiencies for DOD". 13 The Army's military value evaluated both its depots and arsenals on its production capability and its joint workload flexibility. In short, the Army was looking at the capacity being used in each facility and how much of the workload was inter-service workload and how well it partnered with industry. 14 The Army chose to evaluate its depots and arsenals together as maintenance and manufacturing centers. These types of facilities can do both missions. Traditionally, maintenance depots perform a variety of missions -maintenance, supply, and storage. They also overhaul, rebuild, modify, convert, and repair and fabricate Army equipment. 15 Manufacturing centers receive store and incorporate raw materials and sub components into the manufacturing process for end items of equipment and components.
Why an Army Organic Industrial Base
The Army strategy is to rely on the commercial sector to the maximum extent possible in support of defense production. 16 If the private sector lacks a required capability, the organic base acts as gap filler. It is also tasked to maintain a surge capability to maintain a surge capability and a guarantor of competition. As General Paul J. Kern, a former Commander of the United States Army Materiel Command stated in his article on Transforming the Industrial Base, the Army's Industrial Base is seen as the "nation's insurance policy". 17 There are numerous examples of how the Army Organic Industrial Base served as our "nation's insurance policy". During the Global War on Terrorism these depots stepped in to respond to surge requirements that could not be met by the private sector. Some examples include:
• The Army's depots and manufacturing facilities ability to take steel purchased from private companies make it into to steel plates, assemble into kits and ship forward into theater to apply to HMMWVs by depot teams in theater.
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• Anniston Army Depot's small arms repair capability which met the need to repair M2 machine guns; a capability that no longer existed in the private sector.
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• The establishment of a depot at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Personnel from stateside depots were able to move forward into theater, build a depot from scratch, man it and provide the much needed maintenance repair for forces fighting in Iraq. Depot commanders deploy from the United States on a rotational basis to command the Depot. This impressive example demonstrates the flexibility of the Army Organic Industrial Base's ability to quickly respond to emerging requirements with personnel and equipment; something that the private sector cannot do.
It is essential to discuss how the depots are sized. Each depot maintains a core capability. Core is determined by assessing required capabilities for maintenance and repair of weapon systems and military equipment as identified by contingency scenarios prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This allows the depots to respond to the challenges of mobilization, national crisis and other emergencies. Core drives the size of the depot, equipment required, and the skill sets required of the workforce. The core depot maintenance capabilities for a weapon system are assigned to a specific Center for Industrial and technical Excellence (CITE).
This allows the depots to establish public-private partnerships. These partnerships help to bring private industry expertise related to the core competency of the depot. The Army manufacturing facilities do not have a core workload. Current core requirements only look at the near future and not long term. For new weapon systems, the specific facility has 4 years from initial operating capability of the weapon system to establish the core capability for the weapon system. As such, it does not allow the depots to properly train a work force or to provide capital improvement for future systems.
There are several transformational options that the Army can use to make its depot and manufacturing facilities more effective and efficient. These include Lean Six Sigma, publicprivate partnerships, performance based logistics, capital investment program, workforce transformation, and integration of the Army depot and manufacturing facilities into a DOD system.
Lean Six Sigma
Lean Six Sigma (LSS) is a management technique that cuts costs while shortening production lead times. Over time industry has saved significant dollars and increased
productivity. An example of private industry's successes is Motorola, which has saved of $11 billion and tripled its productivity. The theme of USAMC "…is to be faster, more agile, less bureaucratic….was adopted for one reason, to provide better support to the Warfighter." 23 What this has done for the Army depot system is that it has allowed it to compete with private industry. "This culture is 'transforming the DoD industrial base into a competitive strike force.'"
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A few examples of the depots success are as follows:
• Letterkenny Army Depot has reduced cost by $11.9 million and freed up 50,000 square feed of floor space.
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• Red River Army Depot increased output 260% on the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMMTs) and decreased cycle time by 75%.
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• Corpus Christi Army Depot increased mean time between overhauls 383% on the T700 engines and reduced overhaul cycle time 69%.
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• Tobyhanna Army Depot reduced repair cycle time 42% on the AN/TPS-75 Radar.
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• Anniston Army Depot increased productivity on the AVDS engine by 30% and reduced turnaround time by 50%. Corpus Christi has partnered with General Electric for engineering and logistic support.
Most significantly, through this partnership, it has been able to reduce its time spent on overhauling a T700 engine to one third of what it previously took.
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Anniston Army Depot has been a leader not only in the Army but across DOD since forming is first partnership with General Dynamics in 1996 to refurbish and upgrade the M1 tank. Since this time, Anniston Army Depot has initiated a total of 41 public private partnerships, which have generated 4.4 million man hours, $548 million, and 216K square foot of depot facility utilization. 32 Anniston also has 33% of all Army partnerships, 88% of total private sector development and roughly 26% of its workload is done by its partners. 33 Most recently, Anniston served as a sub-contractor for General Dynamics on the Stryker program where this partnership was able to deliver production vehicles within six months. 34 This demonstrates how government infrastructure can support private industry.
Sierra Army Depot currently stores over 2,000 combat vehicles. 35 The Army could benefit by establishing Sierra Army Depot as a long term storage facility for its vehicles much like the Agencies. 36 The environmental conditions at Davis-Monthan, low rainfall and humidity and alkaline soil, make it ideal to store aircraft indefinitely. 37 The mission of Sierra Army Depot is to "serve as the Expeditionary Logistics Center and States Post Office to name a few. 47 The benefit of using FGCs is that it brings together the best of the private and public sector. In the case of Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, Lima
Army Tank Plant and Pine Bluff Arsenal, if these installations were converted to FGCs, this would allow the United States Government to retain the manufacturing capability it needs to support National Defense requirements, and it will allow the Army to divest of unneeded infrastructure. Additional benefits are it allows the government a great deal of autonomy and flexibility of ownership, federal governance, and how these facilities are operated. 48 In summary, public-private partnerships enable the Army to maintain readiness at its industrial facilities. If applied properly the Army can leverage the private sector to provide the funding to maintain underutilized capacity, which may be critical for a national crisis or war and at the same time allows the private sector to use the unique capabilities inherent to the depots and manufacturing facilities. Additionally, partnering enables the government to maintain a rapid response capability as demonstrated by Tobyhanna Army Depot to meet operational requirements, eliminating the burden of having contingency contracts in place.
Performance Based Logistics
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is now DOD's preferred product support vehicle.
Designed to streamline the supply chain, PBL allows DOD to buy outcomes from private industry for the readiness of its weapon systems vice products and services. In short it mandates measurable performance metrics. PBL provides incentives for private industry to improve upon the performance of weapon systems, and sees the public sector and the private sector working hand and hand to come up with the best solution. It can lead to private industry investing into the depots for capital equipment to support specific core capabilities.
Capital Investment Program
The 50% from roughly 160,000 people to about 75,000. 50 During this time the median age of the depot maintenance workforce increased from 40 years to 47 years. 51 The situation is direr for the Army. The average age of civilian personnel working in Army industrial facilities is 49 with 52% eligible to retire by 2009. 52 These reductions have created a "hump" in the number of retiree eligible personnel. To overcome this large exodus of personnel and maintain a quality workforce with the unique skills that are inherent to the Army's maintenance and manufacturing facilities, the Army must implement replenishment and recruitment strategies to ensure for a strong and viable workforce.
Several replenishment strategies that the Army has identified include academic partnerships, re-payment of student loans, improved marketing and an enhance applicant pool. program has increased the skilled labor force available to the Depot. 54 Programs such as the one at Anniston are funded through the Depot's Army Working Capital fund and the state. 55 Additionally, the Army must ensure that it ties its replenishment strategy to its depots core requirements. This has to be not just for the systems that are currently in the inventory but for future systems. This implies that the workforce must be multi-skilled.
Integration into a DOD System Corpus Christi Army Depot could rotate among all four services.
Recommendations
In order for continuous improvement to work the Army must have a long term strategy to deal with the following recommendations:
• For CPI to become a driving force, the Army must continue to institutionalize metrics, certify personnel, provide documentation guidance, and have forums to discuss initiatives.
• The Army must build on its success with lean six sigma.
• Arguably, to make the depots and manufacturing facilities more efficient and effective some laws may have to be amended, or the Army and DOD may need to be more aggressive in taking advantage of the laws. Key examples are CITE, EUL, and ASPI.
These laws will bring private industry investment into the depots and manufacturing facilities. The Arsenal Act should be eliminated and the manufacturing facilities should be designated as CITEs and assigned a core workload.
• The Army must support the capital investment into its depots and manufacturing facilities to ensure that they remain relevant and do not continue to lag behind private industry.
• The Army must continue to apply performance based logistics in support of all weapon systems.
• The Army needs to provide funding for the replenishment of its depot and manufacturing facilities workforce. The workforce is the lifeblood of these facilities and has shown its ability to react to the emerging requirements of the Global War on
Terrorism. The Army should use the success of Anniston Army Depot's work force revitalization plan as a model for all other facilities to follow.
• Establish Sierra Army Depot as the DOD Center for Industrial and Technical
Excellence for Long Term Combat and Tactical Vehicle Storage and Operational Project Stocks.
• The Army should explore the possibility of converting Watervliet Arsenal, Rock Island
Arsenal, Pine Bluff Arsenal, and Lima Army Tank Plant to Federal Government
Corporations. If the Army decides not to do this, these facilities should fall under DOD due to their unique capabilities.
• DOD should establish a Joint Depot Maintenance Command to synchronize the 22 depots among the services to gain greater effectiveness and efficiencies in support of the Warfighter.
Summary
For the Army's maintenance depots and manufacturing facilities to continue to be relevant in the 21 st Century, the Army in conjunction with DOD must transform to meet the needs of the 21 st Century Warfighter. This transformation has to include cost efficiencies that will enable the Army to reinvest these savings back into its maintenance and manufacturing facilities.
Through continuous process improvement the Army can ensure it is continually moving forward by identifying better ways to do business. The Army can leverage lean six sigma and public-private partnerships. These vehicles will ensure that the Army's depots and manufacturing facilities can remain competitive with the private sector and at the same time bring out the best of both the government base and private industry to improve government facilities.
A perfect candidate for a public-private partnership is the storage of combat vehicles at Sierra Army Depot. By establishing Sierra Army Depot as a DOD facility for long term combat and tactical vehicle storage, the Army and DOD could gain great efficiencies and savings. The
Air Force has demonstrated this with its AMARC.
The Army must potentially look at converting its manufacturing facilities to Federal Government Corporations. This would allow the Army to divest of unneeded infrastructure and at the same time retaining the critical core capabilities of these facilities. Additionally, due to the uniqueness of these four facilities, these facilities potentially could fall under DOD.
Performance based logistics will ensure for improved weapons systems readiness and at the same time reducing costs. As this is a fairly new concept for DOD, the Army must continue to leverage PBL to maximize support to the Warfighter.
The Army must make a commitment to fund its capital investment program. Failure to do so will result in the depots and manufacturing facilities to continue to fall behind private industry.
More importantly, it must look to the long term future.
Leveraging laws such as EUL and ASPI are critical to bring private industry investment in the Army's depots and manufacturing facilities. The Army has demonstrated some success in the application of these laws, but now is the time to maximize these laws to the fullest extent possible.
Workforce revitalization is perhaps the most important part in transforming the Army's depots and manufacturing facilities. The workforce's unique skills, which are not easily found in the private sector, allow the Army to quickly respond to emerging requirement during a National crisis. Anniston Army Depot has laid the foundation for a successful program. This program must be exported not only across the Army but all of DOD.
To synchronize the efforts of all the services a Joint Depot Command should be established to reduce redundancies among the services. This would allow DOD to be more responsive to the Warfighter through a streamlined system. This command would require additional personnel, but through consolidation of functions and overhead it would garner personnel savings.
The time is now for the Army to move forward in support of the Warfighter in the 21 st Century. Failure to do so will result in an Army Organic Industrial Base that is nothing more than a mere Cold War legacy.
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